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Abstract— A launch vehicle at the scale and price point 
which allows developers  to take reasonable risks with high 
payoff propulsion and avionics hardware solutions does not 
exist today.  Establishing this service provides a ride through 
the proverbial technology “valley of death” that lies between 
demonstration in laboratory and flight environments.  
NASA’s NanoLaunch effort will provide the framework to 
mature both earth-to-orbit and on-orbit propulsion and 
avionics technologies while also providing affordable, 
dedicated access to low earth orbit for cubesat class payloads. 
 
Index Terms—cubesat, propulsion, technology maturation, 
nanolaunch, launch vehicle  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many small launch vehicles have been proposed.  A few 
proposed vehicles have initiated development and a relatively 
small number have been fielded.  Many current efforts are 
underway ranging from balloon and air-launch architectures to 
traditional range and pad launched configurations.  A review 
of these efforts is detailed by Zapata [1]. 
The Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test system (SCOUT) 
was one of the earliest and most successful small launch 
vehicles.  The concept was proposed in 1957 at the NACA 
Langley Center.  The first successful SCOUT vehicle was 
launched within three years on July 1, 1960.  The rapid 
fielding of the SCOUT vehicle was enabled by taking 
advantage of existing missile assets.  The first and second 
stages were derived directly from the Navy Polaris and the 
Army MGM-29 Sergeant, respectively.  The third and fourth 
stages were adapted versions of the Vanguard solid upperstage 
[2].  The SCOUT vehicle was operational from 1963 through 
1994.  The first payload weighed only 7 kg while the final 
payload was 163 kg [3]. 
The SCOUT program successfully sustained and/or increased 
capability for over thirty years.  While the longevity of the 
program points to an affordable architecture, there is no clear 
evidence of any initiatives focused on reducing cost.  A 1972 
study focused on the most economical approach to reach the 
increased performance goals of the Advanced Small Launch 
Vehicle (ASVL), but it did not suggest a path for maintaining 
performance while reducing the price/cost of each launch.  
When faced with increasing performance or lowering costs, 
managers and programs almost always choose to follow the 
path of increased performance.  
 
 
Figure 1. NASA Langley’s 1972 recommendation on “the 
most economical (lowest cost/launch) approach for 
development of an Advanced Small Launch Vehicle (ASVL) 
for use over the next decade.” [4] 
MSFC’s NanoLaunch Program seeks to duplicate the success 
of the SCOUT launch vehicle while applying two significant 
changes in focus.  First, affordability not performance will 
drive design decisions.  Second, maturing launch propulsion 
technologies will take precedence over delivering payloads to 
orbit.  Performance and reliability will be maintained while 
novel technologies, approaches, operational paradigms, and 
manufacturing techniques are identified and developed to 
reduce the price point for orbital access.  
*Jacobs, ESSSA Group. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140011071 2019-08-31T19:47:57+00:00Z
 II. OBJECTIVES 
The NanoLaunch Program seeks  to establish an affordable 
orbital launch vehicle program that continually matures new 
technologies and implements new approaches to reduce the 
price point for orbital access.  The program is not a launch 
service provider, although it will place cubesat class payloads 
in orbit with each successful launch.  Technology and 
approaches will be sought from government, academic, and 
commercial sources.  The qualification, by flying on 
Nanolaunch, of these technologies and approaches will raise 
the competitive bar and increase the available alternatives 
enabling launch service providers to create and maintain an 
affordable launch service without having to take on the full 
development cost and risk.  Within this paradigm a new stage 
can be tested in flight within the scope and budget of a Phase 
II SBIR. 
A goal of the NanoLaunch Program is  to determine the 
payload and reliability target which minimizes the cost of a 
single successful launch.  In general, the cost of a launch 
decreases with the size of the payload. At some point the cost 
of miniaturization will cause an increase in the launch cost 
even though the vehicle is smaller.  Increasing reliability is 
always desirable; however, a point will be reached where the 
cost of increasing the reliability of a launch vehicle is more 
than the cost of flying a second launch vehicle.   
For example, given a launch vehicle that has eliminated 
correlated failures with 90% reliability, two launch attempts 
with the same payload will yield 99% reliability for mission 
success.  One launch vehicle and payload may be lost but you 
have a 99% chance of successfully placing one payload in 
orbit.  The desire is to determine the reliability target for 
which it is cheaper to build and launch a second vehicle 
rather than pay to increase the reliability of a single vehicle to 
insure mission success.  
The uniqueness of this approach is not the baseline vehicle 
(Figure 1) or the additively manufactured stages that enable 
orbital access rather it is the open “plug and play” 
architecture that allows for the entry of new technologies.  
Three primary objectives are outlined below to reach this 
goal: rides for high payoff technologies, orbital access for 
cubesat class payloads, and training for the next generation. 
A. Provide “Rides” for High Payoff Technologies 
The cost of entry into the launch market today is very steep.  
Novell technologies and approaches are often demonstrated in 
a laboratory environment but lack sufficient evidence to be 
placed in the critical path of existing launch vehicles.  No one 
is willing, justifiably, to risk $30M-$1B (cost of existing 
vehicles) to mature these technologies.  This often eliminates 
many high payoff options because there is no flight data to 
qualify and certify the new technology for flight.   
The end result is that there are no available rides for the 
demonstration of new propulsion systems.  This has 
contributed to a slow evolution in the development of 
propulsion systems and critical launch vehicles components 
such as avionics, guidance and contrand flight termination 
systems.  An affordable launch vehicle which allows high 
payoff technologies in the critical path is needed.  This launch 
vehicle should have clearly defined interfaces that allow for 
“plug and play” component and stage testing. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The baseline vehicle configuration consisting of the 
legacy Black Brant X (Terrier, Black Brant, and Nihka) and 
two printed solid rocket motors with 120 lb (PSRM-120) and 
30 lb (PSRM-30) of propellant. 
B. Provide Dedicated Space Access  
The recent explosion in nano-sat, small-sat, and university 
class payloads has been driven by low cost electronics and 
sensors, wide component availability, as well as low cost, 
miniature computational capability and open source code. 
Increasing numbers of these very small spacecraft are being 
launched as secondary payloads, dramatically decreasing 
costs, and allowing greater access to operations and 
experimentation using actual space flight systems.  While 
manifesting as a secondary payload provides inexpensive rides 
to orbit, these arrangements also have certain limitations.  
Small, secondary payloads are typically included with very 
limited payload accommodations, supported on a non-
 interference basis (to the prime payload), and are delivered to 
orbital conditions driven by the primary launch customer.  
Integration of propulsion systems or other hazardous 
capabilities further complicates secondary launch 
arrangements, and accommodation requirements.  
The baseline system shown in Figure 1 was chosen to enable 
an orbital launch attempt as soon as possible and minimize 
upfront development costs.  The first three stages are the 
legacy Black Brant X sounding rocket which is capable of 
placing two smaller stages in a position to put a 3U cubesat in 
orbit.  The Black Brant X is routinely flown today from 
Wallops Space Flight Center and is an established history [5].   
The two smaller uppers stages utilize additive manufacturing 
to reduce cost and development timelines significantly. This 
baseline vehicle is viewed as a starting point that allows for a 
relatively early orbital launch attempt.  
C. Provide Training for the Next Generation 
The evolving role of NASA has limited the hands on roles 
that new employees and student interns can participate in at 
the agency.  New employees are often asked to tackle insight 
and oversight roles without having had the opportunity to 
participate in an integral way in the activities that they are 
asked to evaluate.  Mentors and retired NASA employees are 
used to help these employees fill valuables roles in the space 
industry.  However, integral involvement in building and 
launching a rocket provides a basis of understand that cannot 
be obtained in other ways.  NanoLaunch offers this 
opportunity at a scale that is affordable. 
The number of employees dedicated to NanoLaunch is 
kept at a minimum level.  Students at the high school, 
undergraduate, graduate, and professional level are utilized to 
solve the key technical challenges faced by NanoLaunch.  
This provides training for these students and NASA 
employees and provides a fresh and innovative flow of 
approaches and concept to NanoLaunch. 
 
III. CHA LLENGES 
The number of attempts to produce an affordable small 
vehicle that have failed to reach maturity attests to the 
difficulties faced in this field.  NanoLaunch has determined 
that when current practices are used the cost of the required 
propulsive stages is less than one fifth of the cost required to 
prepare and place a vehicle on the rail ready for launch.  
Furthermore, the range and handling requirements imposed on 
large launch vehicles are applied at the nano-scale.  Thus, the 
scope of factors to be considered when addressing affordable 
options penetrate deeper and extend beyond the major launch 
vehicle systems and are among the key drivers that must be 
considered as the following challenges are addressed.   
 Fixed Costs A.
The enormous energy required to reach orbit has traditionally 
required independent manufacturing, processing, assembly, and 
range facilit ies for orbital launch vehicles.  Manufacturing facilit ies 
for automobiles, ships, and even airplanes have not required the 
same level of scrutiny and tracking of materials and processes.  
Thus, the full burden of the substantial fixed cost incurred by these 
facilit ies is incurred by the space launch and exploration community.  
To date these costs have not been remunerated by launch rate.  As 
the costs have risen, reliability and success criteria have been driven 
to the point that “ failure is not an option” for space flight.  This in 
turn has required independent production lines for virtually all space 
rated avionics and hardware where once again the fixed cost of 
maintaining these lines falls fully on the space launch community.   
 Qualification and Certification Requirements B.
Nanolauch vehicles must obey the same physics as large 
launch vehicles.  This results in the perception that all 
qualification and certification requirements that pertain to 
large launch vehicles apply to the nano-scale.  For physics 
based requirements  this is clearly correct.  However, all 
requirements, certifications, verifications, and analysis should 
be reviewed to identify appropriate tailoring.  Special 
attention should be given to those requirements that are 
already being validated by other market segments that 
process much higher volumes so that the aerospace industry 
does not have to maintain the full burden of fixed costs. 
 Scaling Mega-lifters to NanoLaunchers C.
Several key factors change when scaling from large vehicles 
to the nano-scale.   
 As the diameter (D) of the vehicle decreases the 
cross sectional area decreases with D2 while the 
mass of the vehicle decreases ~D3 resulting in 
steeply increasing drag losses as  the ballistic 
coefficient decreases rapidly.   
 As the scale decreases manufacturing limitation 
soon begin to drive design optimization versus 
physical constraints such as propellant tank 
pressure.  Minimum build thickness or minimum 
gage often determine key inert masses. 
 Key components such as valves, interstages, 
flight termination charges, and reaction control 
systems do not exist at this scale.  Several 
promising options exist in the automotive and 
hobby markets but performance for a launch 
vehicle application must be verified. 
 Correlations to predict cost and schedule are 
derived from vehicles at least an order of 
magnitude larger with the majority of the data 
points from the expendable launch vehicle fleets 
which are 3-4 orders of magnitude larger.  This 
makes predicting cost and schedule very difficult. 
 On the positive side, achieving a high thrust to 
weight is more easily achieved because of the 
square/cubed law explained for drag.  This allows 
liquid and hybrid systems to obtain adequate 
thrust to weight levels. 
 Range Operations and Requirements D.
The primary range challenges facing nanolaunch have already 
been described under Fixed Costs and Qualifications and 
Certifications.  However, the importance of range operations 
and the range’s impact on launch vehicle costs deserves 
 special consideration.  A launch vehicle can in principle be 
launched from anywhere.  Ranges have been established in 
key strategic locations to optimize launch performance and 
minimize the chance of harm to the public.  Incredible 
capability for handling, assembling, launching, and tracking 
have been established at these facilities.  
Launch ranges have an excellent record.  Harm to the public 
has been limited to equipment and property even with several 
catastrophic failures.   This record attests to the effectiveness 
of current launch procedures and practices.   
The fixed infrastructure and personnel associated with these 
capabilities must be maintained.  To date it appears that 
nanolaunch vehicles will be assessed the same fraction of 
these costs that larger launch vehicles have been assessed.  
When these costs are added to the launch vehicle bill of 
material and assembly costs the resulting bill is often too 
much for a single cubesat customer to absorb. 
IV. CURRENT STATE 
Multiple agencies are pursuing small launch vehicle 
development including: 
 Super-Strypi sponsored by the Defense Department’s 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) [6] 
 The Airborne-Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA) 
program sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) [7] 
 The Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive 
Deployer for Space (SWORDS) sponsored by the U.S. 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command 
(USASMDC) [8] 
 GOLauncher 2 Generation Orbit Launch Services, Inc. 
(GO) sponsored by NASA’s Launch Services Enabling 
eXploration and Technology (NEXT) contract [9] 
In addition to the government sponsored programs multiple 
small businesses have recognized the need for small launch 
vehicles.  NanoLaunch is not a competitor to these efforts, 
rather it offers a path to mature critical technologies for these 
efforts.   
A. New Technologies and the Critical Path 
As outlined in the challenges for nanolaunch, current launch 
vehicles do not allow new technologies in the critical path.  
Thus, the technology evolution is slowed.  Businesses that are 
the correct size to develop a nanolaunch vehicle cannot take 
on the full burden of vehicle development.    Most have been 
stopped after a few successful stage tests. 
B. Restrictions on  Secondary Payloads 
Secondary payloads are constrained to fly when the primary 
payload is ready and must eliminate risk to the primary 
payload.  This has the largest impact on new propulsion 
technologies for cubesats.  These restriction are justified by 
the relative cost of the primary payload compared to the cost 
of the cubesat class payload.  It is not reasonable to remove 
these restrictions.  A dedicated launch vehicle is required at 
an affordable price point. 
V. APPROACH 
NanoLaunch has started with the development of the orbital 
insertion stage and is progressing down the vehicle stack 
from the smallest stages to the largest.  This approach allows 
for the development and implementation of manufacturing 
techniques, new propulsion designs, and approaches at a 
small, more affordable scale.  For additive manufacturing 
NanoLaunch is pushing the build volume limits; however, the 
rate at which additive manufacturing is progressing should 
keep pace with our incremental development approach.  Once 
these approaches along with verification and validation plans 
have been demonstrated for the insertion stage they can be 
applied to the larger stages. 
 Eliminating Fixed Costs A.
Our approach centers on eliminating fixed costs.  Advances 
in manufacturing techniques and microelectronics have 
resulted in the emergence of several key industry bases which 
are supported by the general public but can be exploited to 
reduce orbital access cost.  The key factors used to identify 
these market niches are:  
1) Is the microbusiness self sustaining?  Can it survive 
independent of our purchases? 
2) Do the standard manufacturing techniques and catalog 
components meet our requirements? Can we meet our 
requirements without standing up an independent product line 
that only NASA supports? 
The case of the first Printed Solid Rocket Motor (PSRM-
10) was built using electron beam melting and filled with ~10 
lb of propellant.  Design work for the case, grain, and 
insulation was completed on July 9, 2012.  The contract to 
have the case additively manufacture was released.  The case 
was built and returned to MSFC to be insulated.  The 
insulated case was delivered to AMRDEC where propellant 
was mixed and cast in the motor.  The loaded motor was 
returned to MSFC and successfully test fired on October 16, 
2012, a little over three months from the completion of the 
design, as shown in Figure 3.  This demonstrated a significant 
reduction in cost and schedule for solid rocket motor 
development. 
 
 
Figure 3. Static test firing of the first “printed” titanium solid 
rocket motor case. 
  Low-cost Relevant Flight Environments B.
The NanoLaunch Program has used high power amateur 
rockets to test propulsion and avionics subsystems.  The high 
power rockets have been able to create anticipated flight 
environments such as max acceleration and heating rates.  
This allows the program to purchase commercially available 
rockets and verify that off the shelf avionics will survive 
flight environments.  These tests do not replace traditional 
environmental testing requirements, but they do add 
confidence to the validity of a COTS approach. 
To date we have used these rides to test multiple options for 
inertial measurement units, GPS systems, candidate flight 
computers, telemetry, and data recording systems.  We have 
also tested additively manufactured materials used for both 
the airframe and solid rocket motor domes. 
 
 
Figure 4. NanoLaunch 1a flight at Phoenix missile works in 
Talladega, Alabama. 
 
 Standardized Assembly and Integration C.
In 1999, Jordi Puig-Suari and Bob Twiggs began the 
definition of “a standard for design of picosatellites to reduce 
cost and development time, increase accessibility to space, 
and sustain frequent launches.”  The CubeSat Design 
Specification that resulted from this initiative has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of standardization.  With this 
standard in place, launch service providers have opened up 
and are now confidently providing multiple rides for payloads 
that meet the defined standard.  Satellite component suppliers 
have been able to focus their product lines and are now 
offering generic combinations of hardware and software 
packages that conform to the CubeSat specifications. [10] 
The NanoLaunch Program is attempting to do something 
similar for stages and components that lead to affordable 
launch systems.  Standardizing the interfaces and 
requirements of a Nanolaunch vehicle will allow academia, 
industry, and government laboratories to focus on the 
development of critical technologies.  They will not be 
required to foot the bill for the entire rocket, which in the past 
has been prohibitive.  It will streamline range approval by 
defining a set of standards that each stage must comply with 
to safely operate.  It will eliminate the need to define a unique 
launch vehicle for new technology that desires entry into the 
launch market.  This standardization process is an essential 
component of any ADAS path. 
 Strong Partnering with Acedemia and Industry D.
The NanoLaunch Program relies heavily on its academic and 
industry partners for infusion of new ideas.  To realize 
affordable space access many of these ideas need to be 
brought to a maturity level where they can be integrated into 
a launch vehicle demonstrating manufacturing, integration, 
and operational costs which are difficult if not imposs ible to 
predict accurately.  Our partners often have the resources for 
stage and component development.  They seldom have the 
resources for a full vehicle development. 
The realization of a “plug and play” NanoLaunch vehicle will 
help to alleviate this roadblock.  New technologies will have 
a focus and a vehicle to test cost and performance claims on.  
The focus that NanoLaunch provides is displayed in the work 
of our university partners. 
Over a dozen universities have participated in various 
projects in support of NanoLaunch.  These projects include 
reaction control system design studies, truss interstage design 
and test, “printed” hybrid fuel grains, compliant gimbal 
mounts, additively manufactured valves, full vehicle trade 
studies, adaptive drag control, nozzle optimization, in flight 
measurement of aerodynamic coefficients, and regeneratively 
cooled nozzles.   
 
Figure 5. The University of California, San Diego liquid 
oxygen/RP additively manufactured engine static test firing. 
 
Figure 6. An additively manufacture nozzle with integral 
cooling channels for use as a calorimeter being tested at the 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.  
 
  
Figure 7. A scaled model of Brigham Young Universities 
isotruss interstage built out of ABS plastic. 
 
Figure 5 -7 highlight three university projects. 
 An undergraduate student team at the University of 
California San Diego designed a liquid oxygen/kerosene 
injector and thrust chamber.  The injector featured 
impinging doublets, the chamber was film cooled, and 
the nozzle was regeneratively cooled.  The whole 
assemble was additively manufactured. 
 In close conjunction with Marshall Space Flight Center 
the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, Tennessee is 
determining the maximum heat flux that can be absorbed 
in an additively manufactured Inconel nozzle.  A nozzle 
with 6 water cooled axial stations has been additively 
manufactured.  Heat flux measurements have been 
obtained for low heat flux settings.  The heat flux will be 
increased until the nozzle fails. 
 A senior design team at Brigham Young University in 
Provo, Utah designed, manufactured, and tested an 
isotruss interstage.  The model shown similar to  Figure 7 
was built on a Makerbot and withstood an axial load of 
~600 lb before failing in due to buckling.  A prototype 
using carbon fiber rope is being constructed for testing.   
 
 Right-sizing the Management Approach E.
The challenge with managing the NanoLaunch project is 
centered in its diverse student derived workforce.  Tools that 
allow for the turn over of key project members without the 
loss of technical data are needed.  Several model based 
systems engineering tools are being exercised in an attempt to 
capture the key functions, interfaces, and requirements that 
need to be tracked to insure the system integrity. 
The NanoLaunch Project recognizes that a large portion of 
the fixed cost incurred go to support the salary and wages of 
the workforce.  To be affordable at this scale, team members 
must have multidisciplinary skills.  With the correct skill mix 
a streamlined operation, and simplified standard design, five 
good people should be able to integrate and launch a rocket. 
VI. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The trajectory and operational concept for the baseline 
vehicle is similar to SCOUT.  The vehicle has an initial 
acceleration of around 10 gees to enable rapid spin 
stabilization as it leave the rail.  The Terrier has a short burn 
time and then the vehicle coasts for a few seconds before the 
Black Brant is ignited.  After the Black Brant burns out the 
vehicle coasts until it is out of the atmosphere. 
After exiting the atmosphere the Black Brant will separate 
and the shroud will be deployed.  The reaction control system 
will despin the vehicle and a large pitch maneuver will be 
performed prior to Nihka ignition. The Nikha will separate at 
burnout and the reaction control system will despin and point 
the vehicle in preparation for PSRM 120 ignition.  This will 
be repeated for the PSRM 30 ignition and burn.  The flight 
computer and reaction control system will be housed on the 
PSRM 120 stage. 
Note that all critical separation and maneuvering  events 
occur after the vehicle has left the atmosphere.   
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Affordable access to space can be realized in a timely 
manner.  The NanoLaunch vehicle being developed by MSFC 
will provide a test bed for testing of new propulsion 
technologies.  Each test flight will have a dedicated payload.  
These orbital missions provide focus and rigorous 
requirements to the NanoLaunch propulsive s tages and 
components. 
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Figure 8, Fuel film cooling circuit for a liquid 
oxygen/propane injector. 
 REFERENCES 
 
 [1] E. Zapata, C. McClesky, J. Martin, R. Lepsch, T. Hernani, “ Life Cycle 
Analysis of Dedicated Nano-Launch Technologies.” 
 
[2] P. Tank and J. Williams, “ The SCOUT Launch Program,” LTV Launch 
Systems 
 
[3] The Scout Launch Vehicle Family, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scout_(rocket_family) 
 
[4]  Vought Missiles and Space Company, “ Advanced Small Launch 
Vehicle Study,” NASA CR-112054, 1972. 
 
[5]  NASA Sounding Rocket Handbook,  Goddard Space Flight Center, 
Wallops Flight Facility, 2005 
 
[6] ORS and Super-Strypi. Program information at:  
 http://cires.colorado.edu/events/lidarworkshop/LWG/Oct12/presentatio
ns/003-ORS Briefing to Lidar Winds Workshop--101612.pptx  
  
[7] ALASA. Program information at: 
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Airborne_Launch_As
sist_Space_Access_%28ALASA%29.aspx  
 
[8]  “Boeing Targets 66 Percent Launch Cost Reduction with ALASA”. 
Available at: http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-
space/40023boeing-targets-66-percent-launch-cost-reduction-with-alasa  
 
[9] SWORDS. Program information at:  
http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SWORDS.pdf   
 
[10] Cubesat Design Specification, CDS Rev 13, California Polytechnic 
University, Feb 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
